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I agree with Gary Comstock's conclusion that Ilu: 
research program at Beltsville is not morally justified. 
Moreover, I have no substantial disagreement with the 
demils of his clear, closely-reasoned argument. 
However, it seems to me that two aspects of 
Comstock's argument call for further consideration and 
commentary, both because of their intrinsic philo-
sophical interest and because they are the points in the 
argument most likely to be rejected by those predisposed 
to approve of the Beltsville project. I have in mind 
1. Comstock's claim that "it is morally wrong, in 
the same way if not to Ille same degree, to deprive 
an animal of living conditions in which its basic 
biological needs can be met, as to deprive a 
human of living conditions in which its basic 
biological needs can be met," and 
2. His appeal to the concept of a "primitive notion" 
as part of his defense of (1). 
Let us begin with (1). I think nearly everyone would 
go along with Comstock to the point of agreeing that it 
would be wrong to prevent a pig from meeting its basic 
biological needs for no reason at all, or for some ignoble 
reason such as getting sadistic kicks from doing so, or 
for the purpose of achieving some fantastically 
inconsequential, though otherwise legitimate, human 
benefit. However, a very widespread opinion holds 
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1. that pigs occupy a vastly lower moral status, and 
rightly command significantly less moral 
consideration and respect, than do human beings; 
2. that nominally similar wrongs done to pigs and 
to humans are for that reason not at all morally 
comparable; 
3. that it is therefore not morally wrong even in 
the same way, let alone to the same degree, to 
prevent a pig from meeting its basic biological 
needs as to visit nominally the same evil on a 
human being; and 
4. that it is therefore perfectly acceptable to prevent 
a pig from meeting its basic biological needs in 
order to bring about a legitimate and not 
inconsequential benefit to human beings, even if 
Illis benefit is merely an economic one of the 
magnitude promised by the Beltsville program. 
In short, according to this way of thinking, with its 
emphasis on the allegedly reduced moral status of pigs 
in comparison to that of humans, tlle Beltsville program 
is perfectly justified. 
Comstock, of course, is aware that the issue of 
morally relevant differences between pigs and humans 
is crucial to his disagreement witll his philosophical 
opponents. After all, immediately after arguing that 
no one would consider the economic benefits promised 
by the Beltsville program sufficient to render it morally 
permissible to treat humans the way pigs are treated 
in that program, he goes on to remark that "of course, 
the experimental animals are hogs, not humans." 
However, his worry in bringing this up is Illat "it is 
not apparent to everyone Illat hogs have what most 
children have, namely, the capacity to take an interest 
in their welfare." He seems to assume that if his 
opponents can be brought to see that pigs take the same 
sort of interest in having their own basic biological 
needs met as humans take in seeing their own 
biological needs met, these opponents will then have 
to acknowledge that the same sort of wrong is 
committed whenever a being which takes an interest 
in its welfare is prevented from meeting its basic 
biological needs, whether that being is a pig or a 
human. It is for Illis reason, apparently, that Comstock 
calls his claim that pigs do take an interest in Illeir 
own welfare "the crux of my argument." 
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My own sense, on the contrary, is that a good many 
people who quite readily concede that pigs have 
interests, and indeed who concede even that, at least 
when dealing with matters as elementary and 
uncomplicated as basic biological needs, pigs take the 
same kind of interest with respect to themselves as 
human beings do with respect to themselves, 
nonetheless feel that to thwart an animal's interest is 
not even close to being morally on a par with thwarting 
a human being's relatively similar interest. The reason 
is simply that animals, on the view I am now 
considering, occupy such a vastly reduced moral status 
in comparison to that of human beings that nominally 
similar wrongs done to animals and to humans should 
in fact be regarded as qualitatively different kinds of 
wrongs; indeed, if the "wrong" done to the animal is 
necessary to the furtherance of some legitimate human 
benefit, it should not, on this view, be considered a 
"wrong" at all. 
One can distinguish two different strategies which 
have been used widely in attempts to justify the alleged 
radical difference between humans and other animals 
with regard to their respective levels of moral status.! 
One strategy consists of attempting to isolate some 
feature or cluster of features held in common by all 
human beings, but not held by any nonhuman animals, 
and then claiming tllat any being who lacks this feature 
or cluster of features is, morally speaking, a second-
class citizen at best, or a moral nonentity at worst. TIms, 
various tllinkers have appealed to such features as 
rationality, mastery of a language, possession of an 
immortal soul, the ability to reflect, and so on, either 
individually or collectively, as features a being must 
have in order to count substantially in moral deliberation 
and a5 features which, as it turns out, human beings, 
but no other animals, possess.2 
In my judgment, this strategy cannot succeed. It 
faces at least two powerful and fundamental objections. 
The first of tllese has been much-discussed and is 
sometimes called "the problem of marginal humans." 
The problem is that the defender of this strategy faces a 
dilemma. Either the conditions to be met in order for a 
being to enjoy full moral status will be set high enough 
to exclude all nonhuman animals, in which case some 
severely mentally-enfeebled humans-those who are 
severely retarded or brain-damaged, for example-will 
fail to make tlle cut, or else the threshold will be set 
low enough to include all humans, in which case many 
animals will have to be included as well. 
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To be fair, I must acknowledge that several attempts 
to meet this objection have been put forward. For 
example, it has been argued that the features charac-
teristically possessed by members of the group to which 
an individual belongs are of greater moral relevance 
than the features possessed by the individual in question 
or that we can supplement a high, individually-oriented, 
standard of inclusion into the realm of full moral status 
with an appeal to our natural sympatlly for less fortunate 
members of our own species.3 
I find these attempts miserably ad hoc and utterly 
implausible. To begin with the first attempt, surely it is 
not the case that features characteristically held within 
a group are of greater moral relevance than features 
actually held by the specific individuals in question. If 
tall people are typically better at basketball than short 
people, does that justify giving a basketball-playing job 
to a tall but inept basketball player over a short but 
highly talented one? If men are typically better than 
women at some task, does that justify hiring a specific 
man over a specific woman, when she, in this instance, 
can do the job more capably? And with regard to the 
other attempt to escape this difficulty, do we really want 
to let our natural sympathies play such an important 
role in our ethics? Here I think it is quite proper to make 
tlle much-criticized point that since we would never 
tolerate such a move with regard to justifying our 
differing treatment of individuals on the basis of their 
race or sex, we also should not do so in connection 
with the treatment of individuals on the basis of their 
species-membership.4 
The other fundamental objection to tlle strategy of 
attempting to isolate some feature or set of features held 
in common by all humans but no nonhuman animals, 
so as to include the fonner and exclude the latter from 
the realm of full moral status, consists in questioning 
the moral relevance of the proposed feature or set of 
features. Consider, for example, the idea that what 
places human beings on a special moral plane is the 
fact that they, uniquely, can communicate in language. 
The obvious reply is that while this feature of human 
experience is morally relevant in some situations, it is 
obviously not in others. Thus, while tlle fact that a given 
pig can neither read nor write nor speak in a language 
provides an excellent reason to deny the pig admission 
to study in a university, it is far from clear how its 
linguistic capacities are relevant to the question of tlle 
moral legitimacy of causing the pig physical pain. Here, 
to cite once again Jeremy Bentham's famous line, "tlle 
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question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? 
but, Can they sufjer?"s 
Some might conclude at tJlis point tJlat only a ratJler 
modest, animal-including criterion of inclusion into tJle 
realm of full moral status-for example, sentience, 
rather tJlan linguistic competence or rationality-should 
be adopted, since it is of more obvious moral relevance 
to a greater number of situations tJlan are its competitors. 
However, an alternative conclusion would be that there 
simply is no single feature, or single set of features, 
that is always exhaustively relevant in any situation to 
determining who should, and who should not, be given 
full moral consideration in that situation. The point is 
simply that the characteristics which are relevant to one 
situation are not always tJlOse which are relevant to 
another, so one cannot point to any single set of 
characteristics that some beings might share and declare 
them the unique and sufficient determiners of moral 
status. James Rachels explains this clearly: 
A difference between individuals that justifies 
one sort of difference in treatment might be 
completely irrelevant to justifying another 
difference in treatment. .. [SJuppose tJle law-
school admissions committee accepts one 
applicant but rejects another. Asked to justify 
this, they explain that the first applicant had 
excellent college grades and test scores, while 
the second applicant had a miserable record. 
Or suppose [aJ doctor treats two patients 
differentJy: he gives one a shot of penicillin, 
and puts the other's arm in a plaster cast. 
Again, this can be justified by pointing to a 
relevant difference between them: the first 
patient had an infection while the second had 
a broken arm. 
But now suppose we switch tJlings around. 
Suppose the law school admissions committee 
is asked to justify admitting A while rejecting 
B, and replies that A had an infection but B 
had a broken arm. Or suppose tJle doctor is 
asked to justify giving A a shot of penicillin, 
while putting B'S arm in a cast, and replies 
that Ahad better college grades and test scores. 
Both replies are, of course, silly, for it is clear 
that what is relevant in the one context is 
irrelevant in the other. The obvious point is 
that, before we can determine whether a 
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difference between individuals is relevant to 
justifying a difference in treatment, we must 
know what sort of treatment is at issue....6 
As a corollary to this conclusion, Rachels draws 
another: "namely, that there is no one big difference 
between individuals that is relevant to justifying all 
differences in treatment."? It seems to me that this 
provides just what we need to show that Comstock is 
right to conclude that the wrong done to pigs when they 
are prevented from having their basic biological needs 
met is similar, if not identical, to the wrong done to 
human beings when they are made to suffer tJmt fate. 
Comstock's opponents will want to argue that the 
difference in moral status between pigs and human 
beings is crucial here and, at least according to the 
strategy which I am now considering, that this crucial 
difference in moral status stems from differences in 
rationality, or linguistic competence, or the like, between 
the two species. However, as the argument borrowed 
from Rachels clearly shows, no such move can possibly 
succeed unless these admitted differences between pigs 
and humans can be shown to be relevant to the issue of 
the thwarting of basic biological needs. But the very 
fact that these needs are basic-not advanced and thus 
requiring advanced capacities-and biological-rather 
than cultural or intellectual-indicates that the advanced 
capacities which distinguish most humans from pigs 
are of minimal relevance to the moral evaluation of the 
treatment handed out in the Beltsville program. The 
harm done to tJle Beltsville pigs hurts them in a way 
that is quite comparable to the way in which such 
treatment would hurt humans, were they subjected to 
it. And this treatment violates the interests of the 
Beltsville pigs much in the same way that it would 
violate tJle interests of comparably-treated humans. 
Thus, since there is probably a consensus that such 
treaunent would be indefensible if directed at humans, 
how can it be defended in connection WitJl pigs? 
This brings me to tJle second of the two major 
strategies which have been widely used in attempts to 
defend the idea that nonhuman animals should be 
regarded as occupying only a radically reduced level 
of moral status in comparison to that enjoyed by 
humans. This strategy consists of the simple declaration 
tJlat the rightness of assigning a privileged moral status 
to human beings is intuitively evident-that it possesses 
a kind of deep obviousness which renders argument 
unnecessary and that it certainly possesses a greater 
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degree of obviousness than does any of tlle proposed 
arguments attempting to overturn it. To be sure, one 
might ask for supporting arguments anyway, in spite of 
the alleged obviousness of tlle claim in question. But if 
no such arguments can be found which can stand up to 
scrutiny, this need not imply that we should abandon 
the claim, and this is so because of the very logic of 
justification. So what is to stop us from claiming tllat 
the moral rightness of giving radical priority to human 
interests over those of otller animals whenever tlley 
conflict is simply intuitively evident, a "primitive 
notion," to use Comstock's phrase? Notice that if we 
can legitimately make this move, we presumably have 
all we need in order to defend the Beltsville progranl. 
But can we legitimately make this move? 
It is important to note that Comstock is not in a 
position to make a quick, principled rejection of tllis 
move, since he makes a similar one on behalf of his 
claim that "it is wrong to deprive a being that can take 
an interest in having its basic biological needs met of 
the things it needs to have its basic biological needs 
met." Comstock asserts that this latter claim is a 
"primitive notion," by which he apparently means a 
notion that is so basic and fundanlental that it cannot 
be grounded or justified by appealing to anything else 
even more basic or fundamental, but which is at the 
same time so obvious that nothing beyond mere 
clarification and vivification is needed to render tlle 
notion acceptable to all minimally rational and well-
adjusted persons. 
My own argument in support of Comstock's use of 
the concept of "primitive notions," and one which I 
tllink is consistent with the spirit of his own defense of 
it, runs as follows. If I tell you that I believe A, you 
might justly ask me why, in which case I would invoke 
B in support of A. But suppose that you do not readily 
accept B. 11len I could cite C. and argue tllat it implies 
B. Should you then prove unwilling to accept C, I might 
appeal to D, and so on, but clearly tllis must come to a 
stop somewhere. It would seem, then, that for any 
argument to get off tlle ground it must be possible either 
to assume or eventually to find starting points which 
all parties to tlle discussion can accept. I cannot see 
any way around this analysis. Indeed, it seems to me 
that it holds for all arguments whatever, on all subjects. 
The only reason we are not more aware of this, I suggest, 
is that as a practical matter we all do indeed share a 
large number of "obvious" assumptions in common and 
that these rarely emerge as objects of explicit attention 
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in our discussions and arguments with one another. We 
do not notice tllese assumptions because we are rarely 
motivated to question them or refer to them, their 
obviousness being such that neither we nor our 
interlocutors are often called on to question them, and 
tlleir basicality being such that tlley are remote from 
the higher-level, more complex disputes which usually 
engage our attention. 
But in the context of the present debate, this appeal 
to intuition, or to "primitive notions," has to be 
addressed since tlle appeal is being made on behalf of 
opposite conclusions. Recall that, for Comstock, it is a 
primitive notion that "it is wrong to deprive a ,being 
that can take an interest in having its basic biological 
needs met of tlle things it needs to have its basic 
biological needs met." Since pigs can take an interest 
in having tlleir basic biological needs met, it follows 
that tlle Beltsville program is wrong. But otller thinkers 
invoke intuition in order to argue tllat human interests 
are what really count from a moral standpoint, even if 
we cannot give any cogent argument on behalf of 
denying similar consideration to animals' interests. For 
example, consider the words of C. A. J. Coady in his 
essay, "Defending Human Chauvinism": 
It will be said that the idea that there is 
something specially morally important about 
human beings needs justification...but I'm not 
sure that it has to be [justi~ied]. There are 
various ground floor considerations in ethics 
as in any other enterprise-for an animal 
liberationist such things as the "intrinsic good" 
of pleasure and the "intrinsic evil" of pain are 
usually ground floor. No further justification 
is given for tllem, or needed. It is not clear to 
me tlmt membership in the human species does 
not function in a similarly fundamental way 
in ethics so that there is as much absurdity, if 
not more, in asking "Why does it matter 
morally that she is human?" as in asking "Why 
does it matter morally that she is in painT's 
How, then, do we choose between Comstock's 
primitive notion and Coady's ground floor consid-
eration? Are the two on equal footing? Must our choice 
between them be made simply arbitrarily? 
I think not. I come down firmly on Comstock's side, 
and I do not consider my choice the slightest bit 
arbitrary. By way of explanation, I offer three points. 
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First, it does indeed seem to me powerfully evident, 
from my own experience and from renection on that 
experience, that, for example, happiness is intrinsically 
good and misery is intrinsically bad, or at least that 
happiness is intrinsically better than misery. Can I give 
an argument in support of this valuation, deducing it 
from more fundamental principles or theories? No, it 
seems to me that my valuation is intuitive; or, if you 
prefer, it is a primitive notion or a ground floor 
consideration. Do I have a comparably strong intuition 
supporting the idea that human interests should be 
granted a privileged moral status in comparison to 
animals' interests? I do not. For one thing, when I renect 
on my experientially-grounded sense of the badness of 
my misery, it appears to me quite clearly that the badness 
nows from the nature of misery, rather than from the 
fact that I am the one experieIlcing the misery. To be 
sure, the fact that I am the one experiencing the misery 
explains why I am the one who is intimately aware of 
this particular case of badness. But the misery appears 
to me to be bad as such-something which would be 
bad for whoever experienced it, including, for example, 
a pig. Of course, one could maintain that a pig in fact 
cannot experience such misery, but Ulat is anoUler issue, 
and one which, in my judgment, Comstock answers 
admirably. Alternatively, one might present some 
argument for the conclusion that, while pigs do indeed 
experience the same sort of misery iliat I experience, it 
is not nearly so bad a iliing for the pig to experience it 
as it is for me to do so. But this would require argument. 
Since what is clearly given in my experience of misery 
is iliat the experience ofmisery as such is seriously bad, 
Ule burden of proof is on those who would claim Ulat 
sometimes it is not. Given this burden ofproof, intuition, 
in the absence of argument, will not be sufficient. 
My second point in support ofComstock's primitive 
notion over Coady's ground noor consideration stems 
from ilie observation iliat one of the chief practical 
dangers attaching to any appeal to intuition concerns 
the ever-present possibility iliat one is confusing the 
intuitively evident wiili the merely faIniliar or ilie 
culturally given. And yet, surely my experientially-
grounded conclusion that happiness is intrinsically 
better Ulan misery nourishes independently of cultural 
support and, indeed, would flourish in the face of 
cultural opposition. For happiness and misery do not 
present themselves with the kind of plasticity or 
flexibility necessary for tlleir evaluation to be strongly 
susceptible to cultural manipulation. This does not seem 
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to me to be the case with regard to the issue of the degree 
of importance to which consideratlonsof animals' 
interests should be given in our moral deliberations. 
Consider that, while it would be quite shocking to learn 
of a culture in which misery is greatly prized for its 
own sake, it does not even surprise us to read of cultures 
which assign to animals a radically different moral 
status, whether higher or lower, ilian Umt which we 
assign to iliem. 
Finally, I would point out iliat while our opposed 
fundamental judgments-that misery as such is bad and 
that it is seriously bad only when suffered by humans-
are boili widely held, it is possible in ilie case of ilie 
lat~r, but not the former, to explain ilie l?PpulqriJypf 
tlle judgment by appealing to someiliing other tllan its 
evidentness. I refer to ilie simple point-anoilier to 
which intuitionists WOUld. be well~advised to pay 
persistent attention-tlmt the latter judgment, unlike ilie 
former, is self-serving, benefitting the relatively 
powerful humans who make the judgment, at ilie 
expense of ilie relatively powerless aIlimals, .w4o have 
no say in the matter.9 ' ," 
In conclusion, I reaffirm' my ac~ept~I1ce of 
Comstock's conclusion and of ilie major details of his 
argument. I have here attempted onlytostrengilien ilial 
argument by defending two of its most controversial 
moves against ilie objections iliey are likely to generat~ 
in ilie minds of iliose who would defend ilieBeltsvill~ 
research program: . 
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The Society for the Study of Etllics & Animals 
meets in conjunction with the Division meetings 
of the American Philosophical Association. Papers 
are hereby invited for all 1994 meetings: Pacific 
in Late March, Central in late April, and Eastem in 
late December. 
Papers are welcome on any topic connected with 
ethical issues affecting nonhuman animals. 
Possible topics include: 
• The moral (in)significance of being natural (rather 
than domesticated or genetically engineered). 
• The consonance (or lack thereof) ofAnimal Liber-
ation Front actions with an animal rights ethic. 
• Historical studies of conceptions of the moral 
standing of animals. 
• Animals and the action ethics/virtue ethics 
distinction. 
• The importance of animal issues to philosophy 
and philosophers. 
• Companion animals and paternalism. 
• The ethics and epistemology ofanimal research. 
• and so on. 
A system of blind refereeing is used. Papers must 
be ten to fifteen pages long, double spaced. Three 
copies are required, with the author's name and 
any other identifying information on a separate 
title page. 
Send papers to: 
Harlan B. Miller, Executive Secretary 
Society for the Study of Ethics & Animals 
c/o Department of Philosophy 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
Blacksburg,VA 24061-0126 
Be sure to indicate which meeting is desired. 
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(postmark) are as follows: 
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1994 Central meeting September 1, 1993 
1994 Eastem meeting March 15, 1994 
Papers accepted for meetings will automatically 
be considered for publication in Between the Species. 
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